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Abstract 
This paper examines the major drivers of the asset counterpart of the observed money supply in 
Ghana since the adoption of the Economic Recovery Programmes in Ghana. Using the 
traditional money multiplier approach, the relative contributions of fiscal financing and capital 
inflows to the money supply process were examined. It is found that until the mid nineties, fiscal 
deficit financing was the major driver of the money supply process. In the later years, however, 
changes in the Net Foreign Assets of the Bank of Ghana, driven largely by foreign aid and 
remittances inflows, appear to be the major cause of monetary expansion. Until 2003 when 
discipline improved, government borrowing was also the major component and source of 
changes in the net domestic assets of the BoG. This, the paper argues, implies that the use of 
foreign exchange market intervention could be an effective way of controlling money supply.    
Keywords:  Money Supply Process, Capital flows, Money Multiplier, Ghana 
JEL Classification codes: E51, E52, E58, F35 
1 Introduction 
Ghanaian Economic Reforms Programme that started in 1983 has been adjudged by several 
assessors as one of the few success stories in Africa, and indeed the only in West Africa (see for 
instance IMF, 1994)1. According to the IMF, Ghana is among a group of few Sub-Saharan 
African countries that now have a successfully unified floating exchange rate regime, liberalised 
external sector, and reasonably high real GDP growth, sustained now for over a decade. One 
problem, however, that initially prove to be difficult for the Ghanaian authority is the persistence 
of inflation, which, although has fallen significantly from its pre-reform era, remain quite high 
and volatile (see Table 1). Throughout the reform period, the monetary policy framework was 
monetary aggregate targeting, and the monetary authority had tough time trying to meet targets 
(see Dordunoo and Donkor, 1998). There are two features of the Ghanaian economy during the 
reform period that dominated its money supply process, and have been shown in the literature to 
explain its inflationary process. These are the fiscal deficit financing and rising capital inflows. 
However, given the substantial increase in capital inflows, in the form of foreign aid and 
remittances, over the years, the relative role of these factors might have changed. The major 
objective of this paper, therefore, is to empirically examine the relative role of these factors in 
                                                            
* Dr. Aliyu Rafindadi Sanusi is a lecturer in the Department of Economics, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 
Nigeria.  
1 Some of the not-so-successful reforms in the SSA include those of Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Senegal, 
Namibia, Congo and Malawi. 
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the money supply process since the beginning of the reforms. Specifically, the paper examines 
the major drivers of the observed monetary aggregates. The empirical knowledge of the major 
derivers of money supply is important for effective control of inflation, especially in the context 
of the monetary targeting framework that Ghana adopted during the reform period. Indeed, an 
important issue for monetary management in such framework is the identification of dominant 
component of the money supply. In Ghana, the role of fiscal deficit financing and capital 
inflows, especially foreign aid, has dominated academic and policy discourse (see for example 
Leith and Soderling, 2000; Younger, 1992; Tsikata, 1999; Dordunoo and Donkor, 1998; 
Addison, 2001 and Sowa, 2004).  It has been argued that these two factors have been the major 
causes of monetary expansion, and therefore the failure of the monetary authority to curb 
inflation. This paper therefore attempts to empirically examine the role of fiscal deficit financing 
and foreign exchange inflows in the money supply process using the money multiplier approach.  
To preview the results, it is observed that although both the multiplier and monetary base do play 
important roles in accounting for changes in the observed money stocks, the role of the latter is 
more important. While the effect of changes in the net domestic assets of the BoG dominated 
changes in the monetary base in the early years of the ERP, changes in the net foreign assets of 
the bank of Ghana appear to be the major cause of monetary base expansion since 1996. Until 
2003, government borrowing was also the major component and source of changes in the net 
domestic assets of the BoG. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews monetary management strategy 
in Ghana. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and outlines the methodology. Section 4 
presents empirical decomposition of the money supply process. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Monetary Policy Strategy in the Pre-Inflation Targeting Era 
Monetary targeting had been the policy framework in Ghana prior to its formal adoption of 
inflation targeting in 2007.  Under this framework, monetary management involved determining 
an appropriate rate of growth of (some) money supply aggregates. This rate of growth is then 
targeted using a combination of various instruments. Monetary management in Ghana, since the 
launch of the ERP, has changed considerably in line with changes in the financial system. While 
the major objective of monetary policy - price stability – has remained unchanged, there have 
been some changes in the set of instruments used towards those that are more indirect and 
market based. The intermediate target has been the broad money supply, although the definition 
has been adjusted to reflect the growth of new financial assets, resulting from the liberalisation, 
that have functioned as close substitutes for the monetary assets. Foreign currency deposits are of 
particular relevance in this connection. One major constraint of monetary policy has been the 
persistent need to accommodate unplanned fiscal requirements. In addition, the inflows of 
foreign aid, as well as foreign loans for the purchase of cocoa (in the fourth quarter of every year 
since 1994) have made monetary management more complicated. 
The BoG’s strategy for inflation management is based on the view that inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon, and therefore adopts money supply growth as its intermediate target of monetary 
policy. The financial programming framework used by the BoG is derived from the quantity 
theory equation, which assumes that prices adjust to movements in money supply with velocity 
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determined outside the model2.  The BoG, in consultation with the ministry of finance, 
determines the targets for growth and inflation with the policy implications drawn from the 
financial programme (Addison, 2001)3. This framework implicitly assumes that the exchange 
rate will be permitted to equate demand for and supply of foreign exchange, including aid-
sourced flows. 
Attempts to achieve the ultimate target of monetary policy (low inflation) have, in principle, 
determined the actual growth of the intermediate targets (money supply, defined as M2 and later 
M2+ to include foreign currency deposits) and its components. The main operating targets of 
policy have therefore been Net Domestic Assets (NDA) and Monetary Base (M0) of the BoG, 
with a floor set for Net Foreign Assets (NFA) under the financial programme. Earlier in the 
reform period, NFA were not considered as a major source of liquidity as export earnings and 
other capital flows were low. The major source was net credit to the central government (NCCG) 
and net credit to the private sector (NCPS). However, as exports recovered and confidence of 
international donors in the reforms was restored, foreign exchange inflows became a major 
source of liquidity. The BoG therefore shifted to the use of M0 as the operational target, under 
which primary and secondary targets were set for both the NDA and NFA components of the M0. 
The shift in the use of operational target to M0 to include NFA of the Bank of Ghana is based on 
the central bank’s balance sheet identity, which is discussed in the following section. 
3 Theoretical Framework and the Model 
The theoretical foundation of the Ghanaian monetary policy strategy, and therefore, of our model 
is the standard theory of money supply determination, i.e., the monetary base model. It can be 
seen as a simple extension of the traditional bank deposit multiplier approach to deposit creation. 
Consider the following balance sheet identity (see Addison, 2001): 
2 2 0M mm M= ×          1 
Where mm2 is the broad money multiplier, M2 is the broad money supply, and M0 is the 
monetary base. 
The multiplier mm2 is not unique, its components depends on the definition of the money supply 
used. However, for brevity, M2 multiplier can be written as:  
1
1 cmm
r c
+= +     and   2
1
*
tsfdmm
r c r tsfd
+= + +   
Where c currency-deposit ratio; r is the reserve ratio; tsfd is the ratio of time, savings and foreign 
currency deposit to total deposit ratio. 
                                                            
2 Velocity is unlikely to be constant. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that it is not. It is however stable rather 
than constant in the short run. One implication of non-constancy of the velocity is that monetary policy will tend to 
be more restrictive if velocity falls faster than the model assumes. 
3 The final target of monetary policy in Ghana has been the rate of inflation, with the growth of monetary aggregate 
as the intermediate target while the operational target has been NDA and sometimes reserve money.  
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Assuming that the multiplier can be predicted fairly accurately, or is stable, and then the M2 
target can be achieved by setting the corresponding level of M0 through OMO or foreign 
exchange reserve management. This is because the monetary base can be decomposed as 
follows: 
M0 = NFAbog + NDAbog        2 
NDAbog = NCCGbog+ NICBPbog + OINbog      3 
M0 = NFAbog + NCCGbog+ NICBPbog + OINbog     4 
where:  NFAbog is the net foreign asset of the Bank of Ghana; NDAbog is the net domestic asset of 
the Bank of Ghana; NCCGbog is the net credit to central government; NICBPbog is the net claims 
on Banks and public; and OINbog is other items (net) of the BoG.  
Equation 4 above represents the model. Given the multiplier, it suggests that money supply 
expansion can be driven by either rising net foreign asset of the Bank of Ghana, net lending to 
the government by the Bank of Ghana, net lending to banks and public. Because these are net 
claims on the government, the banks and the public, open market sales have contractionary 
effects on NCCG and NICBP, while open market purchases have the opposite effect. Similarly, 
sales of foreign currency by the central bank have a contractionary effect on the NFA, while 
purchases expand it. Thus, OMO and foreign exchange market intervention can be used through 
the balance sheet of the BoG to regulate the level of monetary base and, given the multiplier, the 
money supply. However, instability or unpredictability of the multiplier may hinder the 
attainment of a desired monetary target. 
The model, equations 1 to 4, can also be represented in terms of the rate of growth of the broad 
money supply as follows: 
2 2 0M mm MΔ = ×Δ          1b 
∆M0 = ∆NFAbog +∆NDAbog        2b 
∆NDAbog = ∆NCCGbog + ∆NICBPbog + ∆OINbog     3b 
∆M0 = ∆NFAbog + ∆NCCGbog+ ∆NICBPbog + ∆OINbog    4b 
In the next section, the model is empirical applied to the pre-inflation targeting period in Ghana. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 The Data 
In this section, the model estimated using the quarterly data of the Ghana’s monetary survey 
obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics for the period 1983Q2-2006Q4. The 
choice of this period is informed by the need to cover the post 1983 reform period before the 
formal adoption of inflation targeting in December, 2006.  
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4.2 Decomposition of M1 and M2 (Equation 1b) 
Figure 1 plots the estimates of Equation 1b, showing changes in real M1, real M0 and the M1 
multiplier. It could be observed that the changes in multipliers and monetary base tended to be 
somewhat offsetting, as would be expected given some stability in the demand for real money 
balances. However, the quarterly fluctuations in both M1 and M2 tend to be associated with net 
movements dominated by either the multiplier or the monetary base (Figures 1). Except in a very 
few cases, net changes in M0 tend to contribute a relatively higher share of the observed 
fluctuations in both aggregates, especially M1 after 1992.  In the case of M2, the money 
multiplier offset tends to matter more in the later years – a jump in M0 is offset partially by a fall 
in the M2 multiplier (Figure 1 panel B)4.  
Figure  1. Quarterly Change in Real M1, Real M0 and Multiplier 
 
 
Source: Computed by the author with data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
                                                            
4 The increased volatility observed after 1992 reflects the disruption of foreign support by the IMF/World Bank, 
leading to temporary slippage in monetary discipline (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).   
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Figure 2 plots (seasonally adjusted) money supply, monetary base and the multipliers, motivated 
by equation 1. It is clear that the multipliers have been subject to both short-term fluctuations and 
long term trend variation. Earlier in the reform period (1983Q3 to 1988Q3) both M1 and M2 
multipliers have been somewhat stable, hovering around 1.2 and 1.5 respectively. This is due to 
stability in the reserve (R) and time, saving and foreign currency deposit (TSFD) ratios (Figure 
3, panel A).  However, the effective implementation of the first phase of the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Programme (FINSAP-I) between 1988 and 1991 led to a significant increase in the 
multipliers, with that of M2 becoming more variable (see Figure 1 and 2; and IMF, 1999). The 
M1 and M2 multipliers rose to around 1.5 and 3.0 respectively during this period, due to the 
decline in the public’s cash holding (as both TSFD and demand deposits, DD, rose) and to a 
decline in the bank’s reserves reflecting, in part, the restoration of confidence in the banking 
system (Figure 3, panels A and B) 5. This movement of money into the banking system was 
facilitated by the increase in the BoG’s rediscount rate (in stages, reaching around 35%) thereby 
encouraging banks to seek deposits elsewhere. As inflation was also declining, real interest rates 
on deposits had become substantially positive for the first time since the launch of the ERP 
(except briefly in 1985; Sanusi, 2009). 
Between 1998Q2 and 2001Q1, however, both multipliers declined steadily from around 1.6 and 
3.3 in 1998 to around 1.05 and 2.2 in 2001 for M1 and M2 respectively. This mainly reflects bank 
reserves and currency rising faster than demand deposits, (Figure 3, Panels A and B) with both 
reserves ratios reaching their peak in 2001. After 2001, the multipliers rose again to stabilise at 
around 1.4 and 2.7, respectively for M1 and M2, as the currency and reserve ratios declined.  
In summary, although the multipliers have not empirically been constant as the programming 
model had assumed, they have been fairly stable and predictable. Changes in the money supply 
have tended to be more as a result of changes in the monetary base. The next section therefore 
returns to the analysis of the components of the monetary base.    
Figure  2. Monetary Aggregates (in Logarithm)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
                                                            
5 The decline in the bank’s reserves ratio has been both due to reduction in both the required reserves and the excess 
reserves during this period (see Figure 3. panel A). 
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Figure 3. Multipliers, Ratios and their Components 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
 
4.3 Sources of Monetary base (Equation 2b) 
It was observed above that changes in monetary base contribute comparatively more than the 
changes in multipliers to changes in the monetary aggregates. In this section, the various sources 
of the monetary base expansion are examined since the launch of the programme.  
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In Figure 4, we plot equation 2b showing the two components of the changes in monetary base, 
i.e. ∆NFAbog and ∆NDAbog. It is noteworthy that over the sample period, the changes in NDA and 
NFA tended to be inversely related and, in some quarters, almost offsetting, leading to small or 
no change in M0. This is suggestive of the use of one or the other of NDA and NFA for 
sterilisation purposes6. For instance, in the early years of the reforms, when foreign exchange 
inflows were not a major source of liquidity, the excessive lending to government for deficit 
financing was sterilised mainly through the sales of donor supplied foreign exchange (Sowa, 
2004)7. The predominant use of NFA (or foreign exchange intervention) to sterilise expansions 
in NDA is reflected in Figure 4 by the tendency of NFA to fall when NDA was rising (negative 
∆NFA and positive ∆NDA), especially up to the end of 1995. The use of foreign exchange 
intervention during this period was made easier for at least two reasons: first, the net foreign 
exchange inflows were relatively small. Hence, the BoG’s sales of foreign exchange were not 
generally enough to satisfy the foreign exchange market, to which it was a major supplier. 
Therefore, increased sales of foreign exchange to sterilise NDA expansion could not have 
seriously hampered the programmes’ objective of a depreciated cedi. Secondly, given the 
shallowness of the financial market, there were few, if any, alternatives to foreign exchange 
sterilisation (such as sales of securities).  
However, since 1996, the NFA by itself had become a source of liquidity due to the increased 
inflows of foreign exchange from foreign aid and external loans for cocoa purchase financing 
and remittances. This is reflected in panel B of Figure 4 as increases in M0 are now associated 
with increases in NFA (see also the decomposition of equation 2 in Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
The BoG, therefore, replaced NDA with M0 as its operational target. The task for the BoG has 
since been to control the growth of monetary base (when both NDA and NFA are expanding) 
without appreciating the cedi in the process. Accumulation of NFA was therefore used to the 
extent that it does not lead to the appreciation of the cedi. The burden of controlling the growth 
of M0 was therefore placed generally on limiting NDA. However, as will be shown later, because 
of the persistence of large public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) that had to be mostly 
financed by the BoG, the control of NDA to reduce M0 growth had been initially very difficult8. 
As such, many M0 growth targets have been missed as both NFA and NDA grew 
simultaneously9. As shown in Figure 4, the reductions in NDA have predominantly been quite 
                                                            
6 Alternatively, if most of the NFA accrue to government, then increases in NFA would be associated with decreases 
in NDA simply because the BoG balance sheet would show a fall in NDA (as government deposit rises) with the 
rise in NFA.  In the more recent years (Fig 4.4) the negative correlation appears to be less – perhaps because NFA 
being monetised, or because other sources of foreign exchange inflows (for example cocoa earnings, FDI, private 
remittances, etc.) became increasingly important in NFA increases. 
7 This is especially so during the first phase of the ERP (1983-1986), when the bank of Ghana was the major 
supplier of foreign exchange in the weekly auctions. In addition, the financial market was still very shallow with 
very few instruments available to the BoG for sterilisation operations. 
8 Attempts to meet these monetary targets by the BoG resulted in the accumulation of domestic payment arrears. 
Indeed, refusal by the BoG to extend overdraft to government resulted to government’s cheques bouncing (see 
CEPA, 2003).  
9 Between 1996 and 2003 both NDA and NFA had predominantly been positive, except in 2000 and 2001 (Figure 
5), when due to the adverse terms of trade shock (since 1999) coupled with delays in aid disbursement and huge 
debt repayment (equivalent to 9.2 percent of GDP in 2000), the foreign reserves were depleted. Indeed, the year 2000 
was especially problematic in Ghanaian monetary management as the TOT shock of 1999 intensified. The price of 
crude oil prices tripled to over US$30 per barrel, the world market cocoa prices descended sharply to a 27-year low; 
and the price of gold, the leading export earner, fell to below US$300 per ounce. This, coupled with low divestiture 
receipts, seriously weakened the government’s revenue base. The ensuing fiscal deficits resulted in accumulation of 
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insufficient (and sometime impossible) to offset the increase in NFA10, leading to large increases 
in the M0. 
Since 2003 when the BoG was granted de jure independence, the inverse relationship between 
NFA and NDA started to appear regular again. This suggests that the BoG during this period has 
been better able to achieve reduction in the NDA. As we shall see later, this is partly because of a 
reduction in lending to government, and intensive use of OMO as the financial market has 
deepened. In the next section, the NDA will be decomposed in order to examine its major 
drivers.  
Figure 4. Contribution of Changes to NDA and NFA to Changes in MB 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
domestic payment arrears (about 4.1% of GDP as at 2000, CEPA, 2001) when the BoG refused to extend overdraft 
in attempt to meet monetary targets. Additionally, the inability of the authorities to meet those targets resulted to 
suspension of aid and loan disbursements thereby compounding the problems (see CEPA, 2003). In fact, between 
1999 and 2001, NDA constituted around 80% of the Monetary Base. 
10 This was mainly due to near absence of market for government securities, and the rising domestic debt burden.  
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Source: Data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
4.4 Decomposition of NDA (Equation 4) 
In Figure 5, we decomposed money base into NFA and the various components of the NDA over 
the sample period (i.e., net credit to central government, NCCG, net indebtedness to banks and 
public, NICBP and other items net, OIN). It can be observed that prior to 2003 (except between 
1989 and 1991) the NCCG had been predominantly the largest component of the monetary base. 
NFA and NICBP have mainly been negative, thus serving as offsetting factors. This reflects the 
BoG’s use of both foreign exchange market intervention and sales of securities to the private 
sector as well as reserve requirement for monetary management. For example, since 1990, the 
steady increases in the secondary reserves requirement (reaching 35% in 2004) has increased 
commercial banks holding of government securities, and hence the BoG’s indebtedness to the 
commercial banks11. Later, when the NFA became a major source of liquidity, there was 
pressure on the BoG to sterilise via reduction in the NDA. However, because of the inherent 
fiscal weakness and the resulting persistent PSBR, reduction in the NDA has been mainly via 
decreased NICBP. As noted earlier, this reduction is achieved first by forcing banks to acquire 
government’s securities and BoG’s bills using their primary and secondary reserve 
requirements12. Later, the BoG resorted to OMO as the major instrument of monetary 
management. Between 2001 and early 2002, government’s official borrowing was mainly from 
the non-bank public, and moved from a net borrower to a net depositor in the banking system as 
its fiscal position improved.  
                                                            
11 In Ghana, two kinds of reserves are required: cash/primary and secondary reserves. Assets that satisfy the cash 
requirement are only domestic cash at the BoG (it excludes banks’ cash in vault). For secondary reserves, only 
government of Ghana bonds, treasury bills and bank of Ghana bills are eligible. These reserves as percent of total 
deposits have been quite high (8% and 35% respectively as of 2004). 
12 For instance, in 1993, additional temporary secondary reserve requirement of 15% was imposed on banks, making 
the total secondary requirement  47% of all deposits 
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Since the end of 2001, there have been some dramatic changes in the monetary management and 
outcomes in Ghana, particularly in terms of the sources of monetary base expansion. Owing to 
the recovery of foreign exchange inflows from aid, remittances and cocoa purchase loans, the 
expansion of NFA started to be a major source of monetary base expansion. Indeed by the 
second quarter of 2003, NFA had taken over from NCCG (and the NDA) as the major 
counterpart of M0 expansion. There are identifiable reasons for these developments: first, the 
resumption of huge external financial support, good cocoa harvests and increased domestic 
revenue generation had strengthened the government’s fiscal position, leading to declining 
PSBR. For instance by 2003, zero net domestic financing of the fiscal deficit was over-achieved, 
with a net repayment equivalent of 0.4% of GDP (CEPA, 2004). Second, the conferment of legal 
independence to the BoG, and the capping of government financing to a limit of 10 percent of its 
revenue encouraged budget financing from the non-bank public. For instance, several securities 
of different maturities were introduced into the market. These include the Government of Ghana 
Inflation Linked bond (in 2001), cocoa bills (in 2002) and the 2-year and 3-year fixed and 
floating government bonds (in 2004). With these, and as the financial market deepened, the BoG 
had become more able to sterilise any increases in the NDA that might result due to NCCG (see 
Figure 5 Panel C). Consequently, there has been decline in both the level of NDA and its 
contribution to the expansion of the monetary base. 
Figure 5. Components of Monetary Base 
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Source: Data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
5 Conclusions 
This paper examined the money supply process since the adoption of the ERP with the aim of 
identifying the major asset counterparts of the changes in the observed monetary aggregates. The 
major findings can be summarised as follows: first, the money multipliers have been subject to 
short-term fluctuations and long-term trend movements, but the net changes in money shock 
seems to be mainly driven by changes in monetary base. Second, changes in monetary base 
appear to reflect changes in both NDA and NFA of the BoG. However, while changes in NDA 
dominated before 1996, NFA started to have a major influence subsequently and, by 2003, 
changes in NFA were the major counterparts of changes in monetary base.  Third, changes in the 
NCCG have been the major driver of NDA expansion throughout the sample. Finally, there is 
evidence that the BoG used both foreign exchange market interventions and open market 
operations to sterilise the monetary impacts of NCCG and inflows of foreign exchange. With the 
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evidence of substantial rise in the demand for real money balances, the effectiveness of these 
interventions can be expected to increase, especially as the recent GDP growth is sustained 
(hence lower inflation). One policy implication of the increasing dominance of the NFA in the 
money supply process is that foreign exchange intervention would be an effective tool of 
monetary control.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1. Contribution of NDA and NFA to MB 
 
Source: Data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
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